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overty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) and Poverty Impact Assessment (PIA)
are recently developed tool kits for analysing the distributional impacts of policies,
programmes and projects on the wellbeing of the population, with particular focus on
the poor and vulnerable. Both approaches provide a comprehensive framework for
analysis while drawing on a wide range of well established approaches and tools
covering economic, social, political and institutional issues.
PSIA involves rigorous in-depth analysis of complex policy reform processes and
promotes evidence-based policy choices and dialogue on reform options. PIA is
a ‘lighter’ approach focused on decisions concerning development projects
and programmes, while also useful for fostering debate and planning for
development results, including in the private sector.
The International Poverty Centre (IPC) is administering a joint UNDP-World Bank Project
on PSIA with a Senior Social Development Specialist from the World Bank Core PSIA
Team as counterpart. The general objective is to promote capacities in developing
countries for analytical work on the impact of national policies and use these results to
influence poverty reduction strategies. This involves adjusting policy design in light
of the impact of policies on poor women and men, and providing evidence to inform
national policy dialogue.
This issue of Poverty in Focus highlights the PSIA and PIA concepts and the experience
so far of using these analytical tools for enhancing policy, programme and project
effectiveness in reducing poverty.
Elke Kasmann, Solveig Bühl and Renate Kirsch introduce the PSIA and PIA concepts
and their respective components and transmission channel analysis.
Renate Kirsch adopts a social lens to policy analysis, focusing on how the structure
of societies and institutional mechanisms influence the reform process.
E. Gacitua-Mario, C. Gros and R. Kirsch underscore the key role of stakeholder power
and policy dialogue emerging from a set of agricultural reform case studies.
Nils Junge stresses the importance of a process approach to PSIA, involving adversarial
groups in joint studies and negotiations on restructuring mines without social conflict.
Sabine Beddies and Jeremy Holland choose the ‘political economy of reform’ angle to
explain how political actors, institutions and economic processes influence each other.
Sabine Beddies et al. illustrate the use of power mapping as a PSIA tool to predict stakeholder
support, opposition and influence on the implementation of water reform in Yemen.
Elke Kasmann discusses the lessons of the German aid agency GTZ in applying PSIA
from a governance perspective, promoting stakeholder participation in policy making.
Alwin Nijholt reports on three PSIAs in Malawi that all led to more pro-poor policy
designs and led the Government to institutionalise PSIA as a basis for policy making.
Kate Bird summarises a DFID review of staff experience of the effectiveness of using
PSIA for evidence-based, participatory, pro-poor policy making.
Elizabeth Stuart recaps a critical NGO review of PSIA practices that finds the process
lacking and too late to feed into the design of reform policies.
Ibrahima Dia and Kerstin Meyer recount the experience of Senegal’s first PIA that proved
a perfect basis for discussing key issues and assessing poverty impacts of a major
industrialisation project.
Sheri Willoughby describes how PIA was used to study the impacts of four businesses
geared towards the ‘base of the pyramid’ markets for the unmet needs of poor people.
This collection of articles is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the
emerging analytical and process management tools of PSIA and PIA, and thus
contributing to more effective policy design and implementation for poverty
reduction results.Poverty in Focus   April 2008    3
PSIA and PIA are tools for
analysing the distributional
impacts of policies,
programmes and projects on
the well-being of especially
poor women and men.
They can be applied ex ante
to assess the expected
impacts as well as ex post
for evaluation purposes.
The main difference between
PSIA and PIA is the level
of intervention which has
implications for the scope
of the analysis and for the
required time and resources.
The core of both approaches
is the analytical framework
of the ‘transmission channels’
through which the impact of
measures is traced through
different social groups
and households.
Poverty and Social Impact
Analysis (PSIA) and Poverty Impact
Assessment (PIA) are recently developed
tool kits for analysing the distributional
impacts of policies, programmes and
projects on the well-being of the
population, especially on the poor. PSIA
involves rigorous in depth analysis of
complex policy reform processes, while
PIA is a ‘lighter’ approach focused on
decisions concerning development
projects and programmes.
Both approaches inform decision-makers
on strategic choices during the design
and implementation of development
interventions and help to identify
mitigating measures when negative
poverty impacts are anticipated. This
facilitates more evidence-based decision-
making and implementation of policies
and programmes. PIA and PSIA are thus
valuable approaches to operationalise
important aspects of the management
for results agenda of the ’Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’.
This article discusses the basic
characteristics of the PSIA and PIA
approaches, their analytical building blocks,
their potential influence on the political
process, their contributions to the Paris
Declaration and the challenges they face.
Both PSIA and PIA can be applied
ex ante to assess the impacts which can
be expected from planned reforms and
programmes. Hence, they have the ability
to open up space for different options,
support the design of mitigating measures
and modifications, and assist decision
makers in choosing the solutions which fit
best. Both can also be applied during the
implementation of a reform or programme
and thus support monitoring progress
against set indicators, adjusting or fine-
tuning operations, and identifying
opportunities for policy reforms. They are
also useful for ex-post evaluation purposes.
Both approaches involve participatory
processes to forge common
understanding and an open and
informed dialogue on development
issues, which can enhance ownership
and create momentum for action.
PSIA has been developed by the World
Bank and development partners—
especially bilateral aid agencies.
It is applied to analyse policy reforms
comprising macroeconomic, structural
and sector policies that are under
consideration in partner countries.
PIA has been developed by bilateral
donors within the task team on
poverty impact assessment of the OECD
Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) and aims at informing operations
at project and programme level and at
facilitating greater harmonisation
in donors’ assessment procedures.
PSIA often requires a considerable effort
of specific data collection for thorough
social, political and economic analysis
comprising a whole range of quantitative
and qualitative tools including micro-
and macroeconomic modelling. As a less
resource intensive version, PIA draws
predominantly on existing data and
analyses. It provides an estimation
of effects and a quick overview.
The main difference between PSIA
and PIA is the level of intervention they
address which has implications for
the depth and scope of analysis.
Thus, the approaches differ substantially
regarding their time and resource
requirements. The limited additional data
collection and analysis allows a PIA to be
finalised in about 2-3 weeks and to cost
on average $15.000-40.000, compared
to a PSIA which usually needs between
6-18 months and costs $50.000-150.000.
These different time and resource
requirements reflect the different scope of
by Elke Kasmann1, Solveig Buhl2
and Renate Kirsch3 PSIA and PIA:
Gauging Poverty Impacts
for Effective Results
1. German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ);
2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD);
3.  The World Bank.4 International Poverty Centre
analysis needed to gauge the various
potential poverty impacts of development
interventions. For example, the impact of
a specific project or programme is usually
more confined and smaller than the
impact of broad policy reforms which
may affect a whole country, e.g. tax
reform. Therefore, a rough assessment
often provides sufficient information
for decisions about the former kind of
interventions, while policy reforms
usually need to be informed by more
comprehensive analysis to capture the
full extent of impacts.
These differences regarding time
and resources have implications for the
process of conducting a PIA or PSIA. The
timeframe of 2-3 weeks for conducting
a PIA necessarily implies a much shorter
process of dialogue and consultation
than the 6-18 months period for a PSIA
which should include considerable time
to engage with the key stakeholders
during the whole process.
A specific feature of the PIA approach is
the provision of standardised formats,
based on a set of pre-defined matrices, to
summarise the results of each module or
element of the analysis. This facilitates an
easy access and reference to the results of
analysis and a comparison of programmes.
However, the described differences mark
two ends of a continuum rather than a
fundamental divide. The type of data and
analysis required depends on the
availability of time, data, funds, capacities
and—first and foremost—on the research
questions under study. PIAs could
involve new data collection while PSIAs
have been done with existing data only.
Both PSIA and PIA provide a
comprehensive framework for analysis
while drawing on a wide range of well
established approaches and tools
covering economic, social, political
and institutional issues. Thus, both are
equipped to shed light on the impacts
of programmes and reforms as well as on
the likelihood of their success in view of
the existing institutional capacities and
political constraints.
The centre-piece of both approaches is
the analytical framework of ‘transmission
channels’. It delineates the most important
mechanisms through which changes
induced by development interventions
and reforms affect the well-being of
different social groups at household level.
This helps to trace the impact chain of
development interventions systematically.
Six key transmission channels are used for
the analysis:
 Prices: production, consumption,
wages;
 Employment: formal and informal,
including self employment;
 Transfers and Taxes: private and
public;
 Access: to private and public goods
and services,
 Assets: human, physical, social, financial,
natural; levels/values and returns;
 Authority: formal and informal power
relations and structures.
Interventions are usually transmitted
through several channels. Not all social
groups are affected by the changes in
the same manner or with the same
intensity. An intervention may result
in both negative and positive impacts
through different channels, e.g.
improving the access to health services
for poor communities and at the same
time lowering disposable income by
increasing fees for health services
(price channel). Also the time horizon is
important: an intervention can have a
short term negative effect but a positive
impact in the long run.
Both approaches use a series of similar
analytical building blocks. The key steps
are the following:
 Identifying stakeholders: those who
are affected positively and
negatively—winners and losers—and
those influential groups and actors
who can influence decision-making
and implementation.
 Understanding the transmission
channels: modelling the major impact
chains of the intervention through
the six channels.
 Assessing institutions: to what extent
the envisaged impacts can be realized
in view of the capacities and other
constraints of involved institutions
and organisations.
 Analysing impacts: the expected
effects—whether intended or not—at
the micro-level and their distribution
across social groups. Impact analysis
can use a wide variety of tools for
economic and social analysis. The
choice depends on the data available,
timeframes, local capacities for analysis
and the importance of indirect impacts
expected from a reform.
 Assessing risks: to anticipate and
avoid unintended consequences.
Risks can arise from certain country
contexts such as political instability,
social tensions, political economy or
institutional weaknesses. They can
also be exogenous such as natural
disasters or regional economic crises.
In addition to these analytical steps, PIA
includes an assessment of the socio-
cultural and political dimensions of well-
being. It looks specifically at the impacts
the intervention has on the capabilities of
individuals or social groups. It also gives
a rough estimation of the potential
impact on MDGs and other strategic goals.
For PSIA, a mainstreaming process within
the World Bank’s operations has started.
Poverty and social impacts of policy
reforms are usually addressed during
the preparation of a budget support
operation, so-called development policy
lending. Since 2004, Bank operational
policy on development policy lending
(OP 8.60) requires task teams to report
on poverty and social impacts in the loan
document. OECD/DAC has developed PIA
more recently (2006).
However, to ensure that the evidence
produced is being used, both approaches
need to feed into decision-making and
policy processes in donor and partner
countries. The process of how PIA and
PSIA are conducted is crucial for their
effectiveness and needs to go beyond
providing reports. Experiences so far
show that the following institutional and
process issues have to be addressed:
 The analysis needs to be embedded
in the policy cycles of partner
countries and donors. The timing for
conducting a PSIA or PIA needs to be
right. They need to take place early
enough to feed into the debate and
actual decision-making.
 The selection of reforms, programmes
and specific topics and questions toPoverty in Focus   April 2008    5
study has to be done in a consultative
and transparent manner. This builds
the foundation for ownership and
potential impact on policy or
programme formulation.
 The analysis needs a solid
institutional anchoring. PSIAs and
PIAs have to be commissioned and
facilitated by relevant players in
the policy process to ensure that the
results are used in decision-making.
 A good strategy for dialogue and
communication at all stages is essential
to encourage broad participation and
ownership for the results.
The actual influence of PSIAs and PIAs
on decision-making has not yet been
thoroughly evaluated. However, there
are examples where governments or
donor agencies have changed their
positions on important issues during
a PIA or PSIA process, e.g. where
development partners identified ways
to move forward with a reform process
or where the process helped to build
trust among the government and civil
society partners.
PSIA and PIA support the Paris
Declaration process (see Poverty in Focus
No. 12, p. 26) in various ways:
1. They are powerful approaches to
improve management for results.
They provide evidence—data and
analysis—on economic and social
impacts of development interventions.
PIA and PSIA assist decision makers to
identify options most likely contributing
to pro-poor outcomes.
2. They support the harmonisation of
development assistance by providing
a common approach for ex ante poverty
and social impact analysis. They use
analytical frameworks endorsed by the
World Bank and the DAC, thus enhancing
collaboration and more joint analytic
work of donors.
3. They initiate and contribute to political
processes which nurture mutual and
domestic accountability of donors,
partner country governments and other
local stakeholders. The experience with
PSIAs suggests that a well designed and
managed PSIA process can contribute
substantially to bringing a broad range
of development partners into the debate
about policies, thus supporting a more
transparent and inclusive policy process.
The PSIA approach was introduced in 2001.
Since then, about 150 PSIAs have been
conducted,  providing a wealth of
experience. Guidelines for PSIA analysis in
a variety of specific sectors have been
developed and tools for social, political
and institutional analysis have been
compiled. Experience has shown that
rigorous analysis is necessary but not
sufficient, and that the way PSIA is
embedded into the policy process is an
equally critical factor for supporting
pro-poor policies. In this line of thinking
a second new focus has been added:
developing capacity for this type of
approach in partner countries in order to
enable national stakeholders to undertake
this type of analysis and to inform the
policy debate.
Because it is newer, applications of
PIA are still limited, and OECD/DAC
recommends scaling up application of
PIA. Equally, it was realised that partner
countries’ participation and ownership
need to be addressed. Issues on process
design and local capacity development
will need to be tackled.
Further application, capacity development
and process orientation could anchor PSIA
and PIA as powerful approaches to
promote a more transparent and inclusive
policy process, nurturing accountability
and results-orientation, and improving
the poverty reduction outcomes of
reforms, programmes and projects.
<http://www.worldbank.org/psia/   and
www.oecd.org/dac/poverty>.  @



























Focus on projects, programmes,
possibly SWAPs and policy
reforms
1-3 weeks; ideally conducted as
iterative, participatory process
Mainly use of existing data
(qualitative and quantitative)
Use of five summary
matrices
Short term and medium term,
direct and indirect impacts
along results chain
Outcome on five capabilities
(OECD/DAC)
Impacts on MDGs and other
national development goals
Part of the structure of
PIA-reports
No
Key part of analysis, to identify
knowledge gaps
PSIA
Focus on policy reforms—
macroeconomic, structural and
sectoral reforms
6-18 months; usually conducted as
iterative, participatory process
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Part of the analysis, to identify gaps
that the PSIA should seek to fill
Analysing distributional impacts
Are considered
Suggested in case of potential negative impacts of intervention,
particularly when on poor or vulnerable people
Identification of key areas for monitoring and evaluation
Assessment areas
Strong focus on ex ante; can also be used during and after implementation
Groups that may be affected and groups that may affect;
Formal and informal institutions
6 transmission channels6 International Poverty Centre
by Renate Kirsch,
the World Bank The “S” in PSIA:
 Adopting a Social Lens
Policy-making is
embedded in a political
negotiation process, in
which empirical evidence
is only one ingredient.
A review of agricultural
reform cases gave








marginal areas likely to be
affected by policy reform.
The findings led to
adjustments in reform
design, which created higher
commitment among key
stakeholders, including
NGOs, to support reform.
Poverty is a multidimensional
experience. Next to income, factors such
as access to assets and services, calorie
intake, power relations and social
positions of people in a community need
to be taken into account. Ex-ante impact
analysis of reform depends in particular
on a full comprehension of the various
dimensions if findings are to lead to
valid predictions of how policies affect
welfare. For a range of reasons, however,
it has been difficult to translate this
understanding into practice. Most PSIAs
are based on economic analysis alone. In
an effort to overcome this bias, the World
Bank has developed operational
guidance conceptualising the political,
social and institutional dimensions of
poverty in PSIA. This article explains how
this can contribute to better and more
robust analysis of policy reforms.
Both economic and social analysis can
assess the likely outcomes, impacts and
risks of the design and implementation of
reforms. Economic analysis uses a variety
of tools to estimate the costs and benefits
of policy interventions on households
and individuals, and tries to predict
behavioral changes in reaction to price
movements or other independent
variables. Social analysis complements this
perspective by focusing on the structure
of societies and how their characteristics
affect reform design and implementation.
Thus, it acknowledges the influence of
institutional mechanisms and political
economy issues over the reform process.
This brings into focus the nature of
power relations, as well as an
understanding of the social construction
of hierarchy, authority, and diversity,
which in turn helps to capture the social
reality of actors and institutions affected
or involved in the policy reform process.
There are several case studies which
illustrate how this has been done.
For example, a PSIA on Crop Board
restructuring in Tanzania portrayed the
ways in which the concerned authorities
have significant influence on the
direction any reform of the Crop Boards
would take. The institutional analysis
revealed that they would potentially
oppose reforms that would reduce their
control over private agents and enhance
the need for greater accountability
on their part in the crop industries.
Traders—who are likely to support the
reforms—have less influence over policy
decisions. Economic analysis alone would
not have been able to provide such
insights into the power relations of
stakeholders, which determine the
rationale and design of reform.
In Zambia, a PSIA assessed a controversial
land privatisation proposal. Stakeholders
were found to believe that taking away
from traditional authorities the right to
allocate land would create a power vacuum
in rural areas, possibly undermining social
stability in the communities. This risk was
fortified by stakeholder perceptions that
the state would not have the capacity
to enforce the new rules and rights
following land titling.
Understanding these political economy
effects of a reform proposal that seems
absolutely sensible from an economic
and sectoral point of view allows for
better assessment of potential risks and
improves the likelihood of a successful
implementation of reform.
Recognising that policy reforms have
different impacts on different social
groups, relevant information is sought
out to allow for the identification of
affected groups, and of opportunities,
constraints and risks—to and from the
policy reform under consideration. Well-
designed programmes can mitigate the
potential negative effects of reform.
A PSIA on Mining Sector Reform in
Romania revealed that women have been
proportionally more affected in terms of
direct job loss than men. Hence, it was
suggested to broaden the scope of socialPoverty in Focus   April 2008    7
mitigation measures to include women
and other vulnerable groups. These
recommendations were taken up by
Government and included in the World
Bank’s “Mine Closure, Environmental, and
Socio-Economic Regeneration” loan
currently under implementation.
A new framework for social analysis in
PSIA has been developed within the
World Bank. It provides a schema to
development practitioners in order to
facilitate the use and application of such
analysis. The framework introduces three
levels of analysis and highlights the need
for an ‘end of exercise assessment’ of risks.
At the macro level the overall country and
reform context is assessed. Policy
decisions are not taken in a vacuum but
are framed by specific country conditions.
Decision making processes are better
understood once the historical and
cultural background, the ideological
climate, the setting of political institutions,
and the economic and social make-up
of a country are assessed. Political
economy issues linked to characteristics
of the constitutional framework, the
distribution of domestic political power,
incentives of political actors, and
the influence exerted by various socio-
economic groups are also investigated
at this level. A better understanding of
these country-specific constraints and
opportunities should increase the chances
of successful implementation.
For example, country level analysis in
Yemen provided insights on why
inequality is increasing, revealing that
insufficient integration of modern and
customary norms is rapidly changing the
rules for managing communal resources
such as land and water. This results in the
concentration of productive land in the
hands of a small number of powerful
families, marginalising in particular
youth, women and rural people.
New opportunities for socio-economic
inclusion, where social mobility was
more detached from social status, were
identified and helped to identify new
employment opportunities (see page 14).
The meso level looks at the policy
implementation process. Shining light on
processes, rules, and incentives
influencing implementation can facilitate
understanding of the conditions under
which reform will be successful. They are
typically transmitted through incentives,
organisational cultures and social norms.
At the meso level the researcher tests
assumptions about the stakeholders and
institutions involved in implementing
policy, including the interests and
influence of social actors—stakeholder
analysis—and about the social rules
governing the implementation of
policy—institutional analysis.
In Chad, a PSIA analysed the distributional
impacts of a proposed policy reform to
privatise and liberalise the cotton sector.
The team conducted an organisational
mapping to gain an overview of both the
formal and informal institutional
frameworks and of organisational
practices, in order to identify potential
constraints and opportunities to certain
stakeholders. Through static and process
mapping the formal as well as informal
rules and procedures could be visualised,
demonstrating actual practices in decision
making, flow of information, money,
and cotton inputs. Results revealed major
constraints in the current set-up, such as a
lack of private markets and communication
infrastructure, organisation inefficiencies
that were spread throughout the vertical
structure of the industry; and limited
bargaining power of farmers’
organisations and their representatives.
Micro level analysis identifies winners and
losers and the dynamics of poverty at
the community and household level. This
level is characterised by hard to quantify
complex, multi-dimensional processes.
Different social groups have different
levels of power, choice, influence and
entitlement, with implications for each
group’s welfare under policy reform.
To estimate the impacts for different
social groups, relevant social variables
are identified and analysed, such as age,
gender, ethnicity, religion, education,
citizenship, occupation, and political
affiliation. The country, reform and
institutional context will help determine
which categories are most relevant and
appropriate for study. For example,
gender analysis in the PSIA on the Uganda
Strategic Exports Initiative showed that
women might disrupt the initiative,
because labour rigidities would diminish
women’s control over labour and income
in both the coffee and fish sectors.
Once the analysis of likely reform impacts
is completed, it is important to review the
reform risks and consider available policy
options. Risk assessment and scenario
analysis are useful tools in this regard.
Both are used to measure confidence
that predicted impacts will occur based
on stated assumptions. Creating and
reviewing different policy scenarios helps
decision-makers to better capture the
potential range of action available to
them. It also helps to test the robustness
of a forecasted impact from the policy
change. This process of considering
policy options is informed by data
generated through the PSIA research.
In practice, the scope of a PSIA rarely
involves generating new data on all three
levels. In most cases it is also unnecessary.
The conceptual understanding of
analysing social and poverty impacts at
these levels already directs teams to review
a very different set of existing information.
This helps in choosing between the need
to generate new information and relying
on existing knowledge when answering
the most important questions. 
Tools for Institutional, Political and Social
Analysis of Policy Reform. A Sourcebook
for Development Practitioners.
The World Bank, 2007.
What does a social perspective contribute to understanding
impacts of reforms?
Social analysis contributes to PSIA in at least six ways:
1. Explains how social identity and social relations may affect reform
outcomes and impacts;
2. Identifies social groups and characteristics, making it possible to distinguish impacts
of reform among different social groups;
3. Looks at formal and informal rules and behaviors, helping to understand power
relations that can influence the reform implementation process;
4. Analyses the political economy of policy reform by systematically assessing
the interests and influence of different stakeholders regarding reform;
5. Helps to identify socio-political and institutional risks to reform; and
6. Emphasizes attention to process and dialogue, helping to broaden ownership
and social support for reform implementation.8 International Poverty Centre
A core objective of Poverty and
Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) is to
provide policy-makers with valid
information on the expected
distributional effects of policy reforms
on different social groups. Results
of such analysis inform the design,
sequencing, and timing of the reform
before it is actually implemented.
However, policy formulation and
decision-making are embedded in a
political negotiation process, in which
empirical evidence is only one
ingredient. Stakeholder groups, some
of which are very well organized while
others are not, exercise their political
interests and influence decision making.
For PSIA to be effective in informing
national policy making it has to pay
attention to stakeholders, power
relation and the policy dialogue around
the reform.
In a review of 23 PSIA studies conducted
in the agricultural sector, the World
Bank assessed how the analysis of
stakeholders and power relations as
well as attention to the policy dialogue
contribute to achieving effective PSIA
that succeeds in informing policy
formulation and implementation. This
article presents results and case study
examples from this review and seeks to
stimulate discussion on how to carry out
PSIA in order to better integrate socio-
political and institutional factors in
policy analysis.
Policy-makers rarely make decisions
completely autonomously. More
often, decision-making outcomes
are a function of the interests and the
power of key stakeholders. Generally,
practitioners have a sound
understanding of the stakeholders
involved in a reform process. However,
without careful attention certain
stakeholders might remain invisible
and are not identified at the outset of
the reform process. As a consequence
their interests stay unrecognized in the
policy discussion process. These groups
tend to be the poor, particularly those
who live in remote areas, work in under-
valued sectors, and are economically,
politically, and socially powerless.
Attention to stakeholder identification
and stakeholder analysis, which sets
interests and influence among groups
into relation, helps to make such groups
visible to policy-makers and allows
analysing how likely impacts of a
reform might affect them.
The study showed that stakeholder
identification was particularly useful
in spotting spatially separated
stakeholders and identifying those
populations in marginalised areas
or regions that would most likely be
affected by policy reform. In the case of
land reform in Cambodia, social analysis
showed that landless households would
benefit the most from the reform which
entailed social land concessions to poor
families. The reform would provide
agricultural land for subsistence
farming, develop unused land in remote
areas and thereby stimulate economic
development at the grassroots level.
However, stakeholder identification
also showed that the military would be
affected negatively by the land reform
and could potentially impede the
reform legislation because it had
expropriated land during the war and
would now have to give it back under
state control. These findings led to
adjustments in the reform design, which
in turn created higher commitment
among key stakeholders, including
non-governmental organisations,
to support the reform.
However, there is still significant room
for improvement in applying
by Estanislao Gacitua-Mario,
Clemens Gros and Renate Kirsch,
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stakeholder analysis in PSIA. The review
of the cases found considerable
variation in the extent to which analysis
of social diversity and gender was
undertaken. In a number of cases,
little explicit attention was paid to
the impacts on women, children or
landless laborers. It is essential that
all stakeholders are identified and
informed throughout the PSIA process
to increase their awareness of how
they might be affected and build their
confidence that their concerns will be
taken into account.
The analysis of power relations and
the policy process was the second
dimension the study focused on.
Attention was given to changes in the
formulation of new rights, obligations,
incentives, and sanctions that in turn
influence the behavior of government
actors and private individuals. The
review found that most of the political
economy risks stemming from changes
in power relations were related to
maintaining control over rents.
The capture of rents seems to be a
particular risk in rural and more remote
areas where transaction costs are
generally high, competition and
oversight often low and marketing
margins large. Other political economy
risks included institutional weaknesses
that could hamper successful policy
implementation, conflicts between
different government ministries,
inadequate engagement of key
stakeholders, and lack of confidence by
stakeholders in the efficacy of the reform.
In Zambia, for example, social analysis
illustrated how traditional authorities
interacted with formal agencies, and
what this interaction meant for the
proposed land reform. On the one hand,
the reform would transfer control over
land tenure from traditional leaders to
the government, making it more likely
that traditional authorities would
oppose the  reform because of their loss
of authority. On the other hand, the
change in land tenure control and
the simultaneous lack of adequate
government presence in rural areas
would create a power vacuum that
would make it difficult to enforce the
new rules and regulations at the local
level. While this critical risk was
identified and taken into account in
the policy process, the PSIA in Zambia
did not consider tensions between
ministries themselves, and the role
of the Ministry of Agriculture in
implementation of the reform was
practically ignored. As a result, conflicts
between the Ministry of Agriculture and
the Ministry of Finance—the sponsoring
ministry—continued after completion
of the PSIA.
This example illustrates the
importance of understanding—before
implementation—whether groups might
have an interest to undermine the new
decision-making structures or sets of
rights the reform intends to introduce.
Powerful opponents might have the
power to impede the implementation
of the intended changes or stop others
from making use of their new
entitlements.
As a third aspect, the Bank’s study
illustrated that the PSIA process often
led to changes in the design of
proposed policy reforms. These changes
were mostly due to three factors: First,
the provision of information that
changed prior perceptions; second,
stakeholder participation in the
identification of policy options;
and third, dissemination of results.
In the case of the Tanzania crop boards
reform, where substantial dissemination
of analytical results took place,
stakeholder groups were able to
discuss and evaluate findings and
recommendations, which subsequently
had more impact on policy.
The early involvement by the
stakeholders with most at stake had
a significant impact on design and
ownership. For example, in cases where
line ministries were not involved until
very late, as illustrated by the cases of
the agriculture market reform in Malawi
and the Guyana sugar sector reform,
support of the reforms by the sector
authorities was weak.
The examples also indicate that there is
an inherent tension in a PSIA process
between analytical results that find
evidence in favour of or against a
reform, and the political reality in which
stakeholder differences become highly
contentious. In the case of Tanzania, the
government recognised the need to
reform the crop boards and formed a
respective task force, led by the Ministry
of Agriculture, to review crop board
performances and their impacts on
crop industries. The joint review of the
Government Task Force, the EU, and the
World Bank uncovered vested interests
determined to maintain the status
quo, and realised that more direct
engagement of key stakeholders at
the political level during the study
could have reduced some of the delays
in the subsequent policy decisions
on the actual reform design and
implementation.
The PSIA review showed that choices
made in the design of the PSIA had a
significant bearing on its results. But it
also identified constraints that impeded
the approach from reaching its full
potential: First, insufficient attention
to, and involvement of, government
agencies that had a stake in the reform
—e.g. PSIAs on agricultural sector
reform that do  not involve ministries
of agriculture as key stakeholders,
but concentrate on central finance
and/or development ministries; second,
limited efforts to disseminate analytical
results, which severely limits their
potential to inform the public;
and third, a lack of clarity among
donor staff about the ultimate use of
the PSIA instrument—whether mainly
for informing donor operations or
the in-country policy dialogue.
In no case under review was an
adequate monitoring and evaluation
system established, and this
shortcoming limits the longer-term
utility of Poverty and Social Impact
Analysis. Addressing these challenges
will enhance the still limited
effectiveness of PSIA in informing
national policy making—a potential
clearly achievable, as demonstrated
by case examples reviewed in PSIA
addressing agriculture sector reform.
Stakeholders, Power Relations and Policy
Dialogue: Social Analysis in Agriculture
Sector Poverty and Social Impact Analysis.
The World Bank, 2006.10 International Poverty Centre
The launching of a PSIA on the
social and employment impacts of mine
restructuring in Serbia in 2005 alerted
many miners to the prospect of imminent
policy changes. The investigation entailed
the obvious risk of provoking social
tensions and thus of sapping the
government’s will to reform. In order to
mitigate the disruptive potential of this
study the most adversarial groups, e.g.
labour unions, were involved from the
very beginning.
The PSIA—renamed a ‘Labour and Welfare
Impact study’ to avoid using the  sensitive
term ‘poverty’—was commissioned to
assess the social and economic
consequences of labour downsizing at
RTB Bor, a copper mine conglomerate
based in the Bor/Majdanpek region
of eastern Serbia. RTB Bor was a large,
socially owned enterprise (SOE), which
was both financially and environmentally
untenable. The company was almost
bankrupt and required huge subsidies
through the state budget—up to $45
million per year. At the same time it was
causing severe and ongoing damage to
the environment. On the other side, the
social and distributional impacts of
reducing surplus labor in an economically
depressed region could not be ignored.
Bor and Majdanpek were mining towns
which owed their existence to the
discovery and exploitation of copper.
Although the copper ore was not
entirely depleted and the region’s
mineral deposits held promise, RTB Bor’s
operations were no longer sustainable
without massive new investments. With
the Ministry of Finance exerting pressure
to streamline the budget, the government
was unprepared to inject hundreds of
millions of dollars into the struggling
SOE. Instead, it decided to unbundle the
company and put RTB Bor’s assets up
for sale through an open tender.
Recognising the inevitability of a difficult
transition phase, the World Bank pledged
to finance both an environmental
clean-up programme and a social and
employment support package for the
economically depressed region.
The main condition was a transparently
conducted sale of RTB Bor assets. The
PSIA study analysed the potential social
and poverty impact of downsizing RTB
Bor’s surplus labour force of 8,356 by
almost 30 per cent. The government’s
interest in this exercise was to make the
company more attractive and signal to
potential buyers that social risks were
being addressed.
The PSIA was built on several
components: quantitative and qualitative
employee surveys, a local business
survey, regional economic studies,
extensive field work and desk research.
These fed into analysis of employee
characteristics and local economic
opportunities. The conditions for an
impact analysis were optimal—three
years earlier over 3,000 employees had
left the mine in a previous round of
redundancies.  Projecting the impacts of
future redundancies became much easier.
Comparisons between current and former
employees could be made, obviating the
need to enter too deeply into the
nebulous realm of counterfactuals.
Dismantling mining operations is one
of the most difficult tasks governments
face. Mining region’s have a natural life
cycle: ore is eventually depleted and the
long and difficult process of transforming
the local economy and transitioning its
workforce must begin. Compounding
the challenges, mine workers are
frequently an intransigent stakeholder
group, especially in Eastern Europe
where they once occupied an exalted








be closed down without
provoking social tensions
that sap the will to reform?
One way is a PSIA process
involving adversarial groups
from the beginning in joint
studies and policy dialogue.
This process-driven PSIA
helped forestall major social
conflict while creating space
for mine restructuring to be
worked out.Poverty in Focus   April 2008    11
In December 2000, facing economic
upheaval after the fall of President
Milosevic, a group of 1,000 RTB Bor
employees had stormed the company
headquarters and forced the
administration to resign. In August 2004,
miners blocked the Serbian highway
leading to Athens during the Olympic
Games, protesting earlier government
proposals to restructure.
When the PSIA study team arrived in the
fall of 2005, employees and their unions
were still far from amenable to
Government plans to reduce the
workforce, dismantle the company, and
sell off its assets. There had been minimal
consultations between the central
authorities and local stakeholders.
People in the region complained that
they had been neglected by politicians
in Belgrade. These grievances were fed
by those former employees who loudly
regretted their decision to leave the
mine. The message was that employees
still with RTB Bor would refuse to accept
the legally mandated severance pay for
SOE employees of €100 per year worked.
The results of a household survey
showed, counter-intuitively, that former
mine employees were not worse off in
consumption/expenditure terms, on a
per capita basis: current employee
households were spending €124 per
capita/month and former employee
households, €130.  Even among the
30 per cent of unemployed former
employees, average monthly consumption
had not decreased. The household was
chosen as the unit of analysis under
the assumptions that consumption
was equally distributed and that coping
strategies were mutually supportive.
These quantitative findings contrasted
starkly with focus group findings
and trade union grievances asserting
that most ex-employees were
experiencing social and economic
difficulties. What might explain
the seeming contradiction?
First, it is quite possible that the worst-
off former employees were the loudest,
constituting an unrepresentative ‘voice’.
Second, wellbeing is multidimensional
in which consumption is just one factor.
From this perspective, a slight increase in
average monthly expenditures may well
have been outweighed by a decline
along other meaningful dimensions.
Even if work in Serbia’s emerging private
sector paid better—trade, transportation
and manual labour were typical post-
mine areas of employment—in many
former Socialist states nothing beats
job security in a parastatal company.
Thus the importance of mixed-methods
evaluation was reaffirmed.
Beyond analysis, implementing the
PSIA process so as to ease, not
exacerbate, social tension presented its
own challenge. Transparency regarding
how information was collected,
expressing the study’s purpose clearly
and involving stakeholders every step
of the way were crucial in getting the
findings considered, even if they were
not universally embraced.
Numerous individual meetings and
roundtables were convened to explain
to miners, union leaders, and managers
the purpose of the research, to elicit
feedback on questionnaires,
methodology, and findings. In this way,
a relationship could be established with
local actors who represented the main
a priori opposition to reform. While
relations were never warm and cosy, this
process created space for dialogue and
an emerging mutual respect. It may have
helped that both the government and
unions shared certain goals¯employee
welfare, rejuvenation of the mine, and
the regional economic support.
The proposed World Bank-financed
support package remained on the table
throughout these discussions.
The PSIA managers worked to broaden
the terms of the debate, pointing out to
resistant stakeholders the risks of an
all-or-nothing approach. The local
view seemed to be that the choice lay
between the status quo¯indefinite and
unlimited state subsidies¯and collapse.
However, the government’s perspective
was rather different. Budget constraints
ensured that the status quo could not
last indefinitely, and the choice was
actually between restructuring and
collapse. The PSIA team pointed out that
insisting on the status quo might be a
high-risk strategy for mine employees.
Their representatives were encouraged
and challenged to propose their own
solutions, and they did. A competing
proposal was developed and advertised
on television. The discussion moved from
outright resistance to competing visions
of change.
Fully aware of the importance of public
opinion, the PSIA team held a workshop
with local and national media. The
government’s rationale for restructuring
and privatising the SOE was articulated,
thus introducing a competing point
of view. Hitherto, the local airwaves
had been dominated by those opposed
to restructuring.
These efforts contributed to a
compromise: 2,350 employees voluntarily
left the company only after unions
negotiated a severance package of €200
per year worked, i.e. twice the standard
amount. The PSIA team advocated
opening a Transition Center to help
employees adjust to life after RTB Bor
and inform them of their rights and
opportunities and this was done. The
unions never stopped pushing hard for
their interests, yet while demonstrations
were threatened at various times, they
did not materialise. In the end PSIA
recommendations were incorporated
into the design of the proposed social
and employment support package and
in June 2005 the government adopted
an action plan for the restructuring and
privatisation of RTB Bor. The Privatization
Agency conducted a transparent tender
and several companies placed bids,
although as of the time of writing a
buyer had yet to be determined.
To summarise, the PSIA process helped
to create the space for negotiation
and compromise among stakeholders.
The interests and concerns of affected
parties were incorporated into the
design of the restructuring policy
and support measures. There should be
no illusions about social issues
remaining a concern for many years.
However, in promoting policy dialogue
this process-driven PSIA helped
forestall major social conflict while
the restructuring of RTB Bor could be
worked out. Authorities now hope to
replicate these methods in addressing
similar issues in the Resavica coal
mining region. 12 International Poverty Centre
In the past, failure to anticipate
political and institutional challenges has
been a chief cause of unsuccessful policy
reforms and development operations.
Many of these have not fully considered
how non-economic factors—such as
institutional constraints, stakeholder
interests and perceptions, political
support or opposition to reform, or
capture of benefits by influential vested
interests—influence reform outcomes.
Thus, the lack of adequate
understanding and management of
‘the political economy of reform’ has
often stalled, cancelled or reversed reforms
or operations that may have had a sound
technical and economic design.
Understanding the political context of
reform processes, however, is important
for engaging effectively in policy dialogue
with policy-makers inside and outside of
government, the private sector, civil
society, and development partners.
A political economy lens provides an
understanding of the relationship
between policy-induced changes in
incentives and sanctions, and changes
in behavior and interests.
It broadens operational considerations
beyond technical solutions and
emphasises the analysis of stakeholders,
institutions, impacts, and risks. This
analysis can then be used to inform
the design of effective and inclusive
processes of stakeholder participation
during the negotiation of policy reforms
and development operations.
Such a more flexible and contextual
approach to policy reform and
operations may require developing
pragmatic, second- or third-best
answers that collaborating agencies
and stakeholders can agree upon rather
than ’perfect solutions’. It requires
technical solutions that are accompanied
by processes of consensus-building,
communication, participation, conflict
resolution, compromise and flexibility.
It can help identify and address possible
risks and opportunities for policy
reforms and operations. This allows
development practitioners to design,
implement, and assess reforms and
operations that are more equitable
and sustainable, which in turn helps
to enhance development effectiveness.
Political economy draws upon
economic, social and political theory
in order to understand how political
actors, institutions and economic
processes influence each other. Political
economy analysis proceeds from a
power-based model of change—at
the collective and individual level.
For instance, it entails the study of
the influence or power of political
institutions and organisations, such as
legislatures, executives, and judiciaries,
and the implementation of public
policy by bureaucratic agencies.
It also analyses the influence or power
of political and societal actors in policy
processes—including various interest
groups, political parties, faith-based
organisations, and the media.
There is an increasing interest in
political economy analysis among
development agencies. This is based
on the need to better understand the
dynamics of ownership as part of the
new ’international aid architecture’ of
country-driven development strategies
under the Paris Declaration.
This reflects the move away from the
rather rigid policy conditionalities
associated with the structural
by Sabine Beddies1, and
Jeremy Holland 2 Analysing
and Managing
Political Economy of Reform
There is an increasing
interest in political
economy analysis through
PSIA in the international
development community.
This is based on the need
to better understand the
dynamics of ownership as
part of the ‘new international
aid architecture’.
Understanding the political
context of reform processes





of change’ are essential
elements that can make
or break a policy
reform process.
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adjustment era and towards a
new development approach that
puts country-driven development
at centre stage.
No systematic approach for analysing
the political economy of reform and its
operational application has yet been
fully developed; different donors use
different frameworks. In addition,
operational experiences with political
economy of reform issues can often not
be used due to the ostensibly technical
relationship between donors and
borrowers. Experience with political
analysis, on the other hand, has not
always been effectively translated
into operations.
Sensitivity to political processes often
involves a long-term, patient and
incremental approach to promoting
policy change which can be at odds with
short-term planning horizons, spending
and accountability demands within
donor agencies. Hence, a key challenge
is to merge high level analysis of the
political economy of reform with
operational strategies and programs
through a conceptual framework
and practical tools that address the
operational challenges. Demonstrating
how political economy analysis
contributes to improved aid
effectiveness and harmonisation can
assist in overcoming these tensions.
To address these issues, the social
development group within the
World Bank is developing a conceptual
framework on the political economy of
reform. Based on the PSIA approach, the
framework combines social and economic
analytical tools to assess the potential
distributional impacts and equity
implications of reforms and operations.
By assessing the likely winners and
losers of reforms and operations, PSIA
identifies the support and opposition
and capture of benefits by powerful
interests of those interventions.
It assesses and addresses issues
concerning ownership and sustainability
of reforms and operations. If powerful
interests stand to lose from the
interventions, they may oppose
reforms or operations by stalling,
delaying or reversing them.
Operational examples include, for
instance, central governments’ opposition
to decentralisation due to loss of power
and resources to local governments or
avoiding reform due to the loss of
economic benefits. Several PSIAs have
specifically addressed the political
economy of reform across several sectors,
such as Bangladesh Chittagong Port,
agriculture in Tajikistan, Chad and
Tanzania, water reforms in Yemen and
Albania, and mining reforms in Romania.
Grounded in the PSIA approach,
this emerging political economy of
reform framework has the following
key elements:
 Reform context comprising the
broad societal, historical and
cultural characteristics of the country,
including its development trajectory
and the current development
aid architecture;
 Reform arena comprising institutions,
stakeholders, economic and political
interests and perceptions, impacts,
risks and opportunities; and
 Reform process, comprising
dialogue, building coalitions for
change, partnership, participation,
transparency, communication, and the
interactions between players in the
reform arena over time.
Preliminary findings of this ongoing
work highlight that all policy reform
processes entail a change in institutions
and stakeholder interest and influence.
Reform interventions that unsettle the
institutional basis for political and
economic, e.g. rent-based, interests
are critical. Political economy of reform
issues can thus be seen as risks or
opportunities for policy reform that
need to be effectively managed.
Findings also show that opportunities
can be created through progressive and
reforming zeal amongst politicians
and bureaucrats motivated by political
and developmental goals. Economic
interests, on the other hand, tend to
defend the status quo and to protect
’rent-seeking’ opportunities amongst
central government actors, bureaucrats
and private sector vendors.
In terms of process, preliminary findings
show that participation, communication,
dialogue and ‘champions of change’ are
essential elements that can make or
break a policy reform process.
A political economy approach through
PSIAs works best when information
generation and dissemination goes
hand in hand with policy dialogue
that supports a more accountable
institutional environment—one which
separates  functions to avoid political
economy blockages while strengthening
civil society oversight of service delivery.
Reform opposition or blockage
can be overcome by supporting policy
and operational design that increases
accountability relations between
government and citizens, by perceiving
reform counterparts as development
partners, and by enlarging the
coalition for change by including
multiple stakeholders from public
and private sector, civil society and
development partners.
To sum up, analysing the political
economy of reform is important to
inform stakeholder dialogue that
involves transparency, openness,
and partnership with policy makers and
the public. The analysis should build
on the PSIA approach and be objective,
timely, and demand-driven. 
The Political Economy of Policy Reforms –
Issues and Implications for World Bank
Lending, The World Bank and Oxford Policy
Management, 2007.
The political economy of reform framework
i. analyses stakeholders, institutions, impacts, risks and opportunities,
ii. uses this during the stakeholder dialogue to
iii. identify and address possible concerns and opposition to policy reforms
and development operations by
iv. integrating these concerns and opposition pro-actively into the design and
implementation of reforms and operations.14 International Poverty Centre
Yemen is a low-income country —
most of its people are poor or extremely
poor. Over the last three decades, Yemen
has witnessed dramatic changes on the
political and socio-economic fronts.
A new governance system emerged after
the unification in 1990, characterised
by decentralisation and integration of
traditional governance structures. There
is a shift toward a market economy from
the past subsistence agriculture of the
North and the command economy of
the South. This led to the weakening
of traditional conflict resolution system
while the formal legal system is not yet
fully effective. Some tribal leaders seem
to act above the law.
The distribution of land and water assets
has become inequitable, due to the
increasing land concentration and
private appropriation of communal land.
This restricts water access. Poor groups
suffer from limited access to endowment
land. Deep well irrigation individualises
water supply and weakens community
systems for water management. Tribal
leaders have become the largest water
consumers; this creates a conflict of
interest between their role as mediators
for dispute resolution within the
community and enhancing their
individual economic gains.
Lack of clean water is an important
aspect of poverty. Yemen’s groundwater
resources are used up faster than
replenished, and the poor are worst
affected. Access to safe water and
sanitation is low, and the poor are worst
served. Irrigation water use is sub-optimal.
The allocation of water investments is
inefficient. Past reform efforts have been
constrained by low implementation
capacity of institutions, capture of
benefits, and reluctance to reform.
A new Ministry of Water and
Environment (MWE) was created in 2003,
with three implementing agencies:—
NWRA for water resources management,
NWSA and LCs for urban water supply
and sanitation, and GARWSP for rural
water supply and sanitation. In 2005, the
Government prepared a National Water
Sector Strategy and Investment Program
(NWSSIP), which aims to address three
main water sector problems:
 Low water resource availability,
groundwater overdraft, and the
vulnerability of irrigated agriculture;
 Inefficient service, inadequate
coverage and high fiscal subsidy of
water supply and sanitation in urban
areas;
 Low coverage and poor sustainability
of water supply and sanitation in
rural areas.
NWSSIP was approved as the national
strategy for water sector reform and is
regarded as one of the most advanced in
the Arab world. It defines objectives,
policies, and approaches as well as action
plans for the medium and long term,
including a four-year investment
programme. Government has also
introduced the key mechanism of Joint
Annual Review of NWSSIP to appraise
progress and verify the validity of targets
and policies by all sector stakeholders.
Two annual reviews have been held
since 2005 and this has become the
single most important event in the sector.
However, full implementation of NWSSIP
remains hesitant because of the political
economy constraints, institutional
fragmentation in the water sector between
MWE, and the Ministry of Agriculture and
Irrigation (MAI); and incomplete fiscal
and political decentralisation.
Government and donors agreed that
some of the major NWSSIP reforms
should be the subject of a Poverty and
Social Impact Analysis (PSIA). The PSIA
was designed as a participatory Yemeni
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have been hampered by low
implementation capacity
of institutions, capture of
benefits, and reluctance
to reform.
A PSIA with power mapping
was carried out on a
national strategy for water
sector reform—one of
the most advanced in the
Arab world.
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exercise with the Government, the World
Bank, GTZ and domestic stakeholders
to (i) understand stakeholder interests
and their support or opposition,
institutions, impacts, risks, opportunities,
and (ii) to build coalitions for change,
address opposition, and enhance reform
ownership. The PSIA addressed both the
equity and the political economy of
NWSSIP implementation to recommend
concrete measures on how to accelerate
implementation in groundwater
management, irrigation, and rural
water supply and sanitation.
Stakeholders chose to include all NWSSIP
subsectors except urban water and
sanitation, where they felt, they have a
good grasp of the reform’s economic and
social impacts and how to mitigate any
negative impacts.
Stakeholders welcomed the study as
an important tool for evidence-based
decision-making, and they validated its
findings and recommendations.
They developed power maps that
show stakeholder support, opposition
and influence regarding NWSSIP
implementation, as well as graphs
that illustrate the flow of funds
and information, and a PSIA Matrix
that matches recommendations with
suggestions on how to overcome
the identified constraints of NWSSIP
implementation and enhance its
equity focus.
A key finding of PSIA is that NWSSIP
reforms have to be implemented with
the right sequencing and dosage of
reforms and support. It showed that
NWSSIP continues to be the right
strategy, but needs to be implemented
as a reform package. While the diesel
price subsidies, largely benefiting the
better-off, was eliminated to counter
the overdraft of groundwater, it has led
to water price increases and in a drop
in consumption by the poorest—both
irrigating farmers and rural water
consumers. NWSSIP may save water,
but this may be at the risk of depressing
the rural economy, hampering
employment and the incomes of
the poor. Poor irrigating farmers, rural
communities, and landless people are
hit hardest by the raised water prices
after the elimination of diesel price
subsidy; the well-off cope better, as
water still remains affordable, and
they access to alternatives.
Vested interests still hamper reform;
for instance, large farmers continue
to capture benefits of water as a ‘free
public good’ via access to land and
tubewell drilling. However, efficiency
and welfare gains can be achieved,
if changes are made in the incentive
structure in conjunction with investment in
efficient irrigation and low cost rural water
supply. Substantial extra effort are needed
to achieve pro-poor outcomes and move
Yemen to the path of ‘more income for less
water‘, but this requires linking institutional
development to investment, especially in
the rural water and sanitation sector.
Through its participatory approach, the
study generated broader ownership of
findings, and contributed to a shift in
perception among key stakeholders.
Specifically, there is a momentum to
enhance NWSSIP equity, overcome the
identified implementation constraints, and
to increase the reform dialogue, especially
among the two water sector Ministries,
who have started to engage in the NWSSIP
implementation debate. This was
also visible in the second Joint Annual
Review (2007), which witnessed increased
involvement of the irrigation sub-sector,
and investments in irrigation improvement.
An inter-ministerial steering committee
has been created to lead the NWSSIP
update and implementation. Public
awareness of NWSSIP and support for
its implementation has also been raised.
The PSIA, however, also stressed that the
process of ownership building needs to go
beyond the usual public agencies
to further engage civil society, water
user groups, and local governments.
Government, donors and stakeholders
agreed to implement priority PSIA
recommendations through a multi-donor
Water Sector Support Program. The quality
of results inspired the German water sector
programme to propose a PSIA for the
urban water and sanitation sub-sector,
which is now in preparation, and the
practical cooperation between World Bank
and German Development Corporation led
to a new quality in relations and
collaboration which extends to other
activities in the Yemen water sector, and
on the global PSIA agenda. 
C. Ward et al.: Yemen’s Water Sector Reform
Program – A Poverty and Social Impact
Analysis (PSIA). The World Bank, 2007.
Stakeholders in the top left quadrant support NWSSIP implementation and decentralisation reform and their willingness
to influence implementation is high, but MWE shows only medium ability to do so (middle left). NWRA branches are
considered highly willing to support reform (top left), but their ability to do so is low (bottom left). In the lower left
quadrant, supportive stakeholders such as poor farmers have low ability to influence reform. Stakeholders in the top
right quadrant have high influence to oppose reform.16 International Poverty Centre
German development cooperation
has been involved from the outset in
developing and anchoring the PSIA
approach at the World Bank and in
partner countries. The German interest in
PSIA is based on the perceived potential
of the approach to address the often
contested and highly complex processes
of policy reform in the context of poverty
reduction strategies (PRS). This article
summarises the lessons learned so far
with PSIA from a governance perspective,
focusing on the following aspects:
 Strengthening national institutions
and democratic processes in partner
countries;
 Acknowledging the political economy
of reform and existing institutional
capacities;
 Balancing a purely economic and
technical view of development with
a social development perspective;
 Supporting the emerging new roles
of donors and the World Bank.
The PSIA approach is based on the idea
that there is no single ‘correct’ policy that
can provide an adequate solution to a
given problem affecting a society.
Rather, there are several policy options
which need to be elaborated, put
forward for public debate, deliberated
by all relevant stakeholder groups and,
finally, decided on by the political leaders.
The nature of policy-making in many
partner countries has been quite
different. Key reform policies were
discussed primarily in secluded
conference rooms within Ministries of
Finance, with representatives from the
international finance institutions and
high-ranking officials from central
Government bodies—often even
without the relevant sector ministries.
With the introduction of PRS and related
dialogue processes, this practice started
to change. The PSIA approach advances
this idea. It supports transparency and
stakeholder involvement and helps to
bring policy formulation and scrutiny
into the local arena.
However, it is crucial to understand
that these are long-term processes.
Many partner countries, especially
in Africa, are comparatively young
democracies; institutions are often fragile
and capacities for policy analysis and
evidence-based policy making still weak.
Policy reforms usually produce winners
and losers. Thus, some social groups will
support a specific reform and others
will oppose it. This kind of information
about the nature of political economy is
of major importance in the design and
management of a policy reform process.
PSIA has the ability to shed light on
these issues by analysing stakeholders,
institutions, impacts and risks.
Furthermore, experience has shown
that acknowledging existing institutional
capacities is a key determinant of the
quality of policy reforms.
The PSIA methodology calls for robust
institutional analysis. At this point,
assumptions about how changes at
the macro level are transmitted through
the institutional system down to the
micro level of households and individuals
have to go through a reality check.
Specific local circumstances are brought
into the picture, which helps in the
process of assessing how and to what
extent the theoretical impact chains—
usually arising from sector knowledge
and economic theory—will be realized.
These institutional issues have always
been a major concern for German
Development Cooperation. GTZ in
particular has emphasised the need
for a better fit between policies and the
institutional environment in order to
make sure that the specific local
circumstances receive adequate attention
by Elke Kasmann,
GTZ More than Research:
A Governance Take on PSIA
Tha PSIA approach is based
on the idea that there is no
single  ‘correct’ policy that
can provide an adequate
solution to poverty and
social problems in a society.
Policy reforms usually
produce both winners
and losers. Thus, some
social groups will support
a specific reform while
others are likely to oppose it.
Policies and programmes
may fail because a
technocratic perspective
underestimates the
influence of social context.
PSIAs should be anchored
in existing structures and
processes in host countries
and include capacity-
building and dialogue.Poverty in Focus   April 2008    17
and are not subsumed within the ceteris
paribus assumptions of general models.
When policies and programmes do not
play out as envisaged, it is often because
a technocratic perspective underestimates
the influence of social context on the
envisaged changes in behavior,
institutional structures and procedures.
For instance, efforts to liberalise the
agricultural sector sometimes ignore the
deeply rooted mistrust of farmers towards
traders and middlemen, especially those
of a different ethnic origin. Farmers
have often opposed liberalisation
because the mistrust of outsiders is a
tradition that is deeply entrenched in
rural society—and nurtured by some
governments that benefit from state
marketing boards. A social development
perspective on agricultural reform can
bring farmers’ perceptions to the surface
along with the relevant political,
historical and social context.
Similar examples can be found in other
sectors, and they all have to do with the
perceptions of social groups, consumers,
citizens and health care clients and
how these will affect their behavior
and reaction to specific policies,
incentives and change. Most policies are
heavily dependent on how institutions
and people react to changes in law and
incentive structures. Economic and sector
thinking can take account of these
reactions and mediating effects only
by way of universal hypotheses. Social
analysis is able to illuminate the specific
reactions and effects of different social
groups and actors on the basis of the
social, historical and political context. The
methodology of PSIA supports a balance
between these different perspectives.
It features multi-disciplinary teams and
a combination of economic and social
analysis as well as quantitative and
qualitative data collection and analysis.
The lessons learnt so far indicate
that the PSIA approach supports the
shift from policy prescriptions and broad
conditionality towards policy dialogue.
The approach can assist partner countries
and donors in shaping their emerging
new roles. With regard to the World Bank,
efforts are underway to promote a more
’sustained engagement’ with client
countries and a general change in
the way the Bank does business.
PSIA can support these changes; we
know from several cases that the PSIA
process had an impact on the policy
options considered by the World Bank
and on the final advice given to client
countries (e.g. local government tax
reform in Tanzania, privatisation of
parastatal markets in Malawi, rural
reform in Zambia). The impact may be
less tangible in other cases but is still
important in terms of influencing the
process and the policy debate.
Despite this overall positive picture,
there is still a long way to go. PSIA is not
a magic wand; all depends on how it is
applied in practice. Good practice PSIA
means anchoring the PSIA exercise as far
as possible within existing structures
and ongoing processes in partner
countries. The crucial point is to
facilitate the PSIA process in a
participatory manner—from launching
the idea, commissioning the work, the
fieldwork itself, through to the process
of feedback into policy debate.
One lesson learnt is that it is essential to
generate good-quality experiences with
this approach in order to avoid any
perception of it being just another
donor-driven instrument and to create
the opportunity for partner country
stakeholders to take up PSIA and
integrate it into their own processes.
Such an approach requires a good
deal of facilitation, open dialogue
and flexibility—all of which seem to be
quite challenging under the prevailing
institutional imperatives of many
donors and of the World Bank as well.
Where do we stand with PSIA today?
A brief stocktaking reveals the following:
 There have been about 150 PSIA
applications since 2001.
 There is already an impressive
number of publications and materials
available: a user’s guide, case studies,
sector guidance, tool kits for economic
and social analysis, training materials,
e-learning courses, etc.
 PSIA is part of the operational
policy of the WB for its budget
support operations.
 There have been trust funds
from several bilateral donors to
support the PSIA work of the WB
and partner countries.
At first glance, this seems to be quite a
mainstreaming achievement. However,
the impression is misleading. The
governance issues described in this
article, such as strengthening democratic
processes and supporting the emerging
new roles of donors, mark long-term
processes of institutional and societal
change in partner countries as well as in
donor organisations and the World Bank.
The progress of the PSIA approach is
linked to its institutional context. PSIA
may push one step ahead, but there are
no quick fixes.
All this said, what is the way forward?
1.  Clarify the role of donors and partner
countries: donors should no longer
steer the PSIA process but facilitate it,
promote good practice and support
capacity-building. However, the ideal of
a purely “country-led approach” is not a
feasible alternative. Experience shows
that donors need to act as brokers
and support investment in political
dialogue—needed to open up for
stakeholder participation and a
public debate.
2.   Focus on quality: Good PSIA work is
more than robust research. It comprises
a participatory process, a multi-
disciplinary team and accompanying
capacity development measures in
partner countries.
3.  Link PSIA to aid effectiveness reforms
at country level: With donors drawing
back from conditionality and direct
involvement in implementation, and
partner countries taking on ownership
for their national development, the
policy dialogue becomes crucial for
the process of alignment.
PSIA could enhance the quality
of policy dialogue and substantiate
results orientation by focusing on policy
issues essential for reducing poverty
and providing robust evidence. PSIA is
endorsed by the World Bank and the
IMF and supported by many bilateral
donors. Thus it is a potentially powerful
joint approach to assist partner country
stakeholders and the donor community
in the search for common ground.
<http://www.gtz.de/en/themen/soziale-
entwicklung/soziale-sicherheit/14052.htm>.  @18 International Poverty Centre




alike about poverty and social
impacts of planned reforms
of key sectors.
They all swayed the reform
plans towards smarter, pro-
poor designs and prompted
the government to
institutionalise PSIAs.
A transparent process of
selecting policy reforms for
PSIA is expected, and then
tracking the implementation
of the key recommendations.
This would involve the
national monitoring and
evaluation systems as well as
civil society organisations.
Three PSIAs have been conducted in
Malawi since 2002. These studies focused
on reforms in agricultural marketing,
the tobacco sector and the water sector,
resulting in important policy debates
between stakeholders. Several lessons
have been learned from the PSIA
experience in Malawi. This article
highlights the main ones.
Malawi’s first PSIA was launched in 2002
as a joint study between the World Bank
and the government. The objective was
to determine the likely poverty and social
impacts of closing down a large number
of markets operated at a loss by the
parastatal Agricultural Development and
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). The
poor financial performance of ADMARC
had become a major source of concern
for the government and the international
financial institutions. At the same time
government, civil society and donors
were concerned that a too radical
restructuring of ADMARC might disrupt
its social function in remote rural areas
where it acted as both buyer and seller
of the staple food maize. ADMARC was
fulfilling an important food security role,
acting as a last-resort provider of maize
especially in the lean seasons.
Based on both quantitative and
qualitative studies, the PSIA concluded
that ADMARC was wasting public funds
and that its marketing operations could
be substantially reduced without any
serious social risks. However, full
privatisation of ADMARC’s operations
was not recommended because of the
persistent market failures in remote areas
where the private sector was unlikely
to step in due to the poor roads and
high transport costs. The findings
and recommendations turned out
to be strikingly similar to those of an
earlier independent study, commissioned
by Oxfam Malawi.
The PSIA informed the decision on a
World Bank structural adjustment credit.
One of the major concerns of especially
the civil society was that the process
seemed to be donor-driven with limited
stakeholder consultation. The findings
were shared with government and some
civil society leaders in September 2003.
However, before the main dissemination
workshop the President called for a
special session of Parliament to approve
the privatisation of ADMARC. This was
primarily a political gesture to show
commitment to the restructuring
process. The details still had to be
agreed with stakeholders.
Based on the PSIA recommendations the
World Bank reviewed its policy advice
and adopted a more nuanced stance on
ADMARC, no longer promoting full-scale
privatisation. Still, the controversial
decision by government to privatise
ADMARC before presenting the PSIA
findings left a somewhat bitter aftertaste
among the public.
This experience indicates the importance
of appropriate timing and engaging all
relevant stakeholders in the whole PSIA
process in order to create a sense of
national ownership and increase the
probability that the recommendations
will be implemented. Yet, the findings
and recommendations were eventually
accepted by all main stakeholders.
The restructuring of ADMARC,
separating its social and commercial
functions, is still in process.
The second PSIA focused on the
proposed restructuring of the tobacco
sector. Studies were carried out with
support from the World Bank. The
consultative process with stakeholders
was more inclusive. Based on the
conclusions, the Ministry of Agriculture
came up with recommendations which
by Alwin Nijholt,
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were approved by Cabinet in April 2005.
The measures taken appear to have
contributed to more efficiency and
competitiveness in the marketing chain.
The experience of these two studies
prompted the government to plan for
the institutionalisation of PSIAs under
the leadership of the Ministry of
Economic Planning and Development.
In 2005, a multi-stakeholder Steering
Committee was established with the
responsibility of selecting key reforms
to undergo a PSIA and to supervise their
implementation. The 2006-2011 Malawi
Growth and Development Strategy
(MGDS), i.e. the second poverty reduction
strategy, was to benefit from more
routine impact analyses.
The impetus for the third PSIA was a
call for proposals from a global PSIA
programme operated as a joint initiative
by UNDP and the World Bank. In
February 2006 a PSIA proposal was
developed by the government together
with UNDP-Malawi to assess the impact
of private sector participation in the
distribution and management of water
services in low-income areas in Blantyre,
the largest commercial centre, and the
capital Lilongwe. However, there was
relatively limited input from the Ministry
of Irrigation and Water Development in
the PSIA proposal. The ministry’s priority
was to finalise the second National Water
Development Programme to be funded
by the World Bank.
Following acceptance of the grant
proposal the Water Sector PSIA was
conducted in November-December 2006
and consisted of an analysis of previous
quantitative studies, a literature review
of international experiences with water
sector reform, and qualitative data
collection including focus group
discussions and key informant interviews
at community and household level.
The draft report was discussed at length
with stakeholders represented in the
Steering Committee. The final report
was presented in March 2007. The key
findings were subsequently discussed
with staff from the water ministry.
The key findings of the PSIA point to
the high risk of privatisation of water
companies in urban low-income areas,
because it is likely to result in price
increases, hence reducing access to water
for the poor. The main recommendation
is that management of the Water Boards
should not be privatised since it is a
high-risk strategy. Instead, small-scale
private sector participation in the
distribution of water should be
encouraged, scaled-up and regularised.
Liberalisation of water distribution is
expected to lead to positive impacts via
increased competition among water user
associations, domestic resellers, private
water kiosk mangers, etc. Concurrently
government should prioritise substantial
investments in the water infrastructure
and address supply constraints.
The Water Sector PSIA has been praised
by all stakeholders as a high quality
study. However, despite the endorsement
of the study at senior levels, many
officials in the water sector still seemed
to perceive this as an externally driven
study which might delay approval
of a World Bank credit for the water
programme. Privatisation of the Water
Boards, initially one of the favoured
options by the Ministry of Finance,
is no longer being pursued. Instead, a
management contract or service contract
is being considered, but a final decision is
currently awaiting debate in Cabinet and
Parliament. It should be noted however
that the decision not to privatise the
Water Boards was made prior to the
publication of the PSIA findings. It is still
too early to determine to what extent
the PSIA ecommendations will be taken
into account in the implementation
of the national water programme.
Yet a number of lessons emerged from
this study. First, the fact that for various
reasons the key players in the water
sector were not fully involved in the
design of the PSIA resulted in half-
hearted ownership of the study results
as indicated by some of the
misperceptions upon presentation
of the PSIA findings. Second, it would
have been more appropriate if the PSIA
had been conducted earlier in the
design stage of the national water
programme. It would also have been
preferable if it had been fully integrated
as one component of that process
rather than becoming a parallel exercise.
Third, the impact of the PSIA might have
been more pronounced if it were fully
embedded in the national development
strategy as a critical analytical tool. In
that case all stakeholders, including
politicians, would have been obliged
to take it even more seriously.
Fourth, the limited capacity and
multiple responsibilities of the planning
ministry delayed the process at times.
Institutionalisation ultimately requires
more than a few committed individuals.
In terms of the way forward, there is
need to apply the lessons learned
from the PSIA experience in Malawi.
Institutionalisation is the key word in
order to further develop PSIA as a useful
instrument for evidence-based decision-
making. The following elements are crucial:
 Ensuring participation of all relevant
stakeholders in the process from start
to end, including government
officials, politicians, academia, civil
society, the private sector, media, etc.
A participatory process plus a
thorough analysis can increase
a government’s leverage vis-à-vis
donors’ views on critical reforms;
 Getting the timing right to ensure
that PSIAs—before, during or after
a reform—are conducted on time to
feed into the national policy process;
 Developing national capacity and
grooming high-level champions to
lead the PSIA process. Time, financial
and human resources need to be
invested to build an institutional
home for PSIA.
To ensure optimal use it would be
preferable for PSIA to be firmly integrated
as a component of the Malawi Growth
and Development Strategy. Currently,
government and donors are developing
options for further institutionalising PSIA.
This is expected to result in a transparent
process of selecting policy reforms to be
subjected to a PSIA and subsequently
tracking the implementation of the key
recommendations through the existing
national monitoring and evaluation
systems as well as by civil society
organisations where necessary. 
Republic of Malawi, MEPD/MIWD: Private
Sector Participation in the Distribution and
Management of Water Services in Low
Income Areas […], Lilongwe, 2007.
<http://go.worldbank.org/DELNZ1XUD0>.  @20 International Poverty Centre
In recent years, PSIA has been used
increasingly as an analytical tool to assist
in the process of policy design. But how
effectively has it contributed to evidence-
based, participatory and pro-poor policy-
making processes? This article summarises
a review of DFID staff experience.
Modern aid architecture emphasises
national ownership of development
strategies and resource management.
A main conclusion from the review was
that a central goal of PSIA is to support
national decision-making processes.
Resource and methodology issues
should not detract from PSIA’s key role
as a generator of domestic momentum
around evidence-based policy-making.
National ownership and engagement in
PSIAs varies widely: some governments
view PSIA as a donor requirement or a
donor led project, while others design,
commission and fully fund PSIAs to
support their own decision-making.
However, in general, few aid recipient
governments would implement PSIA,
routinely, to identify the likely impact of
proposed policy changes or to highlight
suitable mitigation measures for groups
likely to be negatively affected.
One reason for this apparently limited
enthusiasm is clearly a resource constraint.
This is why donors should support the
development of national systems which
use PSIAs as an integral part of their
planning and policy processes. However,
there are challenges which are perhaps
even more pressing; the commitment to
poverty reduction is weak amongst many
national and local policy elites, and the
role of evidence in policy-making is limited.
There has been a continuum of
approaches to identifying and prioritising
issues which require examination through
a full PSIA—from heavy reliance on
donors at one end to greater levels of
national autonomy at the other. At one
end of this continuum is the World Bank
which has identified, designed and
funded a number of studies which have
provided the evidence required for
continued Bank support. Further along
the continuum are examples of donors
suggesting topics to a government and
offering to provide technical assistance.
Other scenarios include governments
asking for donor assistance, topics
arising from donor-organised workshops
and consultations or after discussions
between donors and local research
partners. There is limited experience so
far of PSIA topics being identified as a
result of internal government processes
with little donor involvement.
PSIAs on topics identified and prioritised
by national governments may follow as
they become more widespread, as capacity
increases within government and as
evidence-based policy-making becomes
more embedded. Examples in the review
show how other factors, e.g. political
stability, may cause governments to seek
out assistance for commissioning a PSIA.
The review indicates a range of issues
that have emerged when implementing
PSIAs to date: the in-country capacity—
or lack of it—to carry out PSIAs; the
problems of accessing quality data;
timing of PSIAs to ensure they are real-
time policy analysis etc.
While some positive examples emerged
of high quality and independent
research teams conducting PSIAs, the
most common complaint has been the
weakness of domestic research capacity
and particularly the lack of research
teams able to carry out combined
qualitative and quantitative analysis.
The review showed, however, that in
some cases the very process of
conducting a PSIA actually helped enhance







engagement in PSIAs varies
widely across countries.
Resources are limited and
sometimes also the real
interest in poverty reduction
and evidence-based policies.
Civil society has had limited
opportunities to engage
in PSIAs and influence
policy-making.
Yet, there are many examples
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There are many examples of creative and
context-specific research methods used in
PSIAs. In all cases, these choices have been
affected by context, topic, institutional
capacity, donor requirements and time
constraints. Central to most PSIAs is the
need to integrate qualitative and
quantitative research. In general,
experience suggests that an iterative
process between the two approaches
is required so that the conclusions and
recommendations in the PSIA are based
on all the research findings.
Many second-generation PSIAs have been
commissioned by the World Bank, by DFID
and by other bilateral donors since the
completion of the pilot PSIAs in 2001. The
degree of donor co-ordination around
PSIAs varies greatly. In some countries
there has been substantial collaboration
around PSIAs while in others it has
depended on individual relationships
or has been weak, with different donors
approaching PSIAs very differently.
The review showed that donors do not
appear to be in agreement about the key
purpose of PSIAs, about many details
concerning their implementation nor
about their primary end user. In
particular, there appears to be differences
of emphasis between the IFIs and DFID.
The World Bank has tended to use PSIAs
primarily as a component of due
diligence accompanying its lending
operations and has tended to prioritise
PSIA topics according to its reform
agenda in a particular country.
DFID’s approach to PSIAs has differed
from that of the World Bank; the key
constituency has been identified as
national governments and PSIAs have
been seen as opportunities to increase
the use of evidence in policy-making.
This has led to much greater emphasis
on government involvement in PSIA
processes; the production of ‘real-time’
results and the stimulation of national
policy debates.
Experience so far has shown that civil
society has had limited opportunities to
engage in PSIAs and even where CSOs
have engaged in national debates
around PSIAs they have had limited
policy influence. Many PSIA studies have
been inaccessible to civil society. In some
cases this has been because the complex
and highly technical content has
challenged national CSO sectors with
limited capacity. But also the differences
of perceived audiences for, and purposes
of, PSIAs has determined the level of civil
society engagement, and in some
countries civil society has, to a large
degree, been excluded.
The review shows cases where the
proposed policy change is highly
contentious, civil society has commonly
been kept at arms length to allow the
government to carry out the changes
without too much public debate.
However, there are also cases where civil
society has been brought into highly
charged PSIA discussions as a way of
widening understanding of the rationale
for the proposed policy change.
PSIAs do open up opportunities for civil
society to build their capacity to engage
in policy discussions; DFID is taking
advantage of this opportunity in some
cases to find and support CSOs to
engage in future PSIAs. However,
ensuring meaningful civil society
participation also relies on the PSIA
design, and donors and PSIA consultants
need to be sensitive to power
differences in each society.
Another main conclusion of the review
is that the political context and the
existing culture of evidence-based
policy-making is crucially important in
determining the levels of engagement
in PSIAs and the extent to which
PSIA-derived evidence is able to
influence policy. The review confirms
the importance of political and historical
circumstances in shaping how evidence
is used to influence policy. While robust
evidence can be persuasive, it is still
only part of the picture and power
networks mediate the impact
of evidence on policy.
Increasing the utilisation of such
evidence is a complex process and it
cannot be assumed that PSIAs will
necessarily deliver rapid change.
Understanding the political dynamics
of policy change, particularly those
forces in society that may be supporting
or opposing change, may improve the
likelihood that evidence will be used
to influence decisions and support
successful policy implementation.
Opening up opportunities for
parliamentarians, civil society and the
general public can be beneficial and can
also help to make PSIAs more influential
in policy terms. Political and power
analysis is an important start to
understanding and predicting
where it may be possible for research-
based evidence to have an impact
on policy-making.
The type of policy change under review
together with the context and the
quality of the PSIA output strongly
influence the potential impact that
PSIAs have on policy and decision-
making processes. Different uses of
ex ante analysis also clearly affect its
impact on policy. The first approach
to PSIAs assumes a policy vacuum on
a given topic whereby a number of
policy alternatives can be considered
and evaluated on the basis of their
respective distributional impacts.
The second and more common
approach to PSIAs is to apply PSIA tools
to evaluate the likely impact of a policy
decision that has already been agreed
to raise awareness in governments and
donors and, where necessary, suggest
measures to increase benefits or reduce
costs to specific social groups.
Often PSIAs are linked to policy
reforms tied to IFI lending to national
governments. In these cases, the
question arises as to whether the extent
of international consensus behind such
policy changes together with intense
pressure to comply actually limits the
scope for an objective ex ante evaluation
of alternative policy scenarios.
It is still too early to evaluate the
impact of PSIAs on policy outcomes.
Furthermore, the complexity of policy
processes means that it is not always
possible to trace a clear link between
PSIA recommendations and policy
outcomes. While short-term policy
influence is important, the review
emphasised the role PSIAs could play in
strengthening national policy processes
more generally.
K. Bird, Z. Curran, A. Evans, S Plagerson:
What has DFID learned from the PSIA
process? ODI, London 2005. <http://www.odi.
org.uk/PPPG/poverty_and_ inequality/publications/
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Despite the importance of
PSIAs for the policy-making
process, the IFIs are not
supporting developing
countries adequately.
Too often the process
is lacking and the analysis
comes too late to feed into
decision-making.
Even when the research
is done on time, it is
sometimes ignored by
staff when designing IFI
lending programmes
and conditionality.
There is a real trade-off
between fostering debate
and the need to inform
policies in a timely manner.
There is strong evidence that
policies are more likely to lead to
the reduction of poverty if they are
developed with the participation
of those they are likely to affect.
This is the intention behind the Poverty
and Social Impact Analysis, a tool
designed to ensure that governments
can make an informed choice of policy
direction,  based on a full assessment
of the consequences—intended or
otherwise—on citizens of a range of
alternative policies and projects.
Yet in spite of the obvious importance
of PSIAs for the policy making process—
and that conducting them is the clear
policy of both the World Bank and the
IMF—these leading international
finance institutions (IFIs) are neither
supporting developing countries
adequately in this process, nor carrying
out the vital analysis themselves.
First, it should be observed that some
impact analysis is being done by the IFIs;
and some of it is being done well. There
are positive examples in Ghana and
Romania, for example (see Box).
However, too often even when it is
being carried out, the process is lacking.
It frequently has little influence on World
Bank and IMF programme design and
PSIAs rarely explore different policy
options. In many cases the timing of PSIA
is wrong. Often the analysis is conducted
after the reform has already been
implemented or too late to feed into
decision-making.
Even when the research is done on time,
it is sometimes ignored by staff when
designing their lending programmes.
A World Bank review in 2006 found that
project documents written by staff
failed to make proper use of PSIA
assessments, merely including generic
information on poverty in a country.
Further, only eight of the 35 PSIAs
examined by a World Bank review, gave a
comprehensive analysis of distributional
impact on both winners and losers. And
the majority only looked at the positive
effects of a reform.
The World Bank’s PSIA guidelines say that
the process should involve as many key
stakeholders in the reform as possible,
including civil society. However, a study
carried out by the NGO Eurodad found
that in many PSIAs, researchers from the
relevant county were involved only
tangentially or not at all.
One of the key reasons for undertaking
PSIA is to enable developing countries
to have informed debate about their
own development. However, much PSIA
is never made public, preventing open
and frank discussions of the pros and
cons of different policy choices. While
the IMF has carried out a limited number
of micro-level PSIA, it has not made
attempts to use these highly technical
documents, and convert them into a
tool for stimulating debate among the
wider population.
So what would ‘good’ PSIA look like?
Too often, the World Bank and IMF—
and some bilateral donors—are put off
because of concerns that it will cost too
much and take too long.  However,
capacity constraints should not be an
excuse for not doing this vital work.
In the case of the World Bank, even a very
simple approach, such as a desk study
carried out by an in-country researcher,
can deliver a preliminary PSIA while more
complex approaches are developed.
At the IMF, there is much more scope
for Resident Representatives and their
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local staff to liaise with in-country
researchers. And PSIA from outside the
specific country should be read more
widely across regions and rganisational
departments to improve understanding
of possible consequences in the
first instance.
While the IFIs have a responsibility to
ensure that no major reform or project
goes ahead without PSIA, they should
not be conducting the analysis alone.
Instead, the process should be driven
from start to finish by the country—i.e.
the government—in consultation with
stakeholders including civil society,
rather than by the IFI. This multi-
stakeholder group, put together for
the entire poverty reduction strategy
process, should decide what is to be
examined and lead the methodology
design. Independent domestic
researchers should play a leading
role in the study with support from
the IFI and donors. This has the
additional benefit of developing
analytical capacity in-country.
The World Bank together with donors
should also provide increased funding
to enable developing countries to
conduct PSIA themselves. This would
both allow Southern research
institutions to carry out their own
studies, and develop the capacity of the
government to administer and manage
PSIA and so foster a greater sense
of domestic policy ownership.
PSIA should consider a range of options
rather than just serving as a way to
make a particular pre-determined policy
more palatable. An effective PSIA should
be based on the idea that a reform or
project entails a significant outlay for
a government, and therefore needs to
assess whether it is value for money in
terms of the poverty impact. It should
look at two or three different ways to
achieve the same outcome, examining
the effects of the poorest people of
each. It could also include the cost to
government and the trade-off this
would entail against other expenditures.
PSIA should use both qualitative
and quantitative techniques, for a full
understanding of likely consequences.
Assessing both the economic and
social impacts of reforms on key
income groups is crucial, particularly
the poorest who are most vulnerable
when change happens.
The study should be a genuine attempt
to judge the differing impacts that a
certain policy would have on different
groups of people. This should
specifically include a gender dimension
as vulnerable women are affected
differently by change than men are,
even men living in the same household.
The timing of the analysis has to
be right. As a report from the UK
Department for International
Development says: ”In order to make
a real impact on policy decisions,
PSIA should be undertaken as early
as possible prior to policy formulation.
The potential policy options and trade-
offs should then be considered on
the basis of evidence, and the best
solution identified.”
Finally, the way in which PSIA is used
is also vital. PSIA should not simply
be a means to design safety-net
programmes, or used to drive through
conditionality, but instead be made
available to relevant stakeholders—
particularly the most vulnerable—to
spark debate. This would mean that
decisions made in the reform process
are genuinely embedded in the needs
of the domestic population, particularly
those of the poorest, and that the trade-
offs that the reform entails are
acceptable. This is how to make
effective, sustainable policy that
will deliver results in fighting poverty
in the long term.
Of course, PSIA cannot mask the fact
that there are often no easy options in
a reform process. And it is not cost-free.
There is a real trade-off between
fostering debate and the need to inform
policies in a timely manner. Furthermore,
impact assessment cannot annul politics
or soften the clash of competing
domestic interests. However, it can and
should ensure that policies are made in
a more informed way. And if a country
really isn’t ready to implement a change,
there is plenty of evidence that it will
not in any case be sustainable. Both IFIs
should urgently address their failure to
enact their own PSIA policies. 
Blind spot: The continued failure of the
World Bank and IMF to fully assess the
impact of their advice on poor people.




Romania: The government needed to restructure its mining sector in 2004. Aware that
the closure of uneconomic mines had been triggering large-scale redundancies, the
Ministry of Economy and Commerce asked for a PSIA. The analysis was developed in
close partnership between the government and the World Bank. It examined the
distributional impacts of the reform on mining and non-mining communities; gender
impacts; and the distribution of wages and subsidies in the mining sector. It found, for
instance, that women are more affected by the closure of mines than men, and to a
greater extent than is the case with other professions. The study led to, among other
things, the creation of a monitoring programme and a small grants scheme especially
for women and young people.
Ghana: While the final list of subject matters for a 2003 PSIA was, in the end, selected
by the donors including the World Bank and IMF (which insisted on petroleum pricing
and electricity tariffs being added to the list), there had been a very good, inclusive
process for choosing topics until that stage. The National Development Planning
Commission—a government body that also oversees the Poverty Reduction Strategy—
held a series of national workshops to discuss PSIA opportunities in the country,
according to a Eurodad study. The final PSIA influenced the government’s design
of the petroleum subsidy and identified means to offset the negative impact of the
reform on the poor.
The PSIA process
should be led by
the government
and involve
civil society.24 International Poverty Centre
Senegal conducted its first PIA in 2007.
This analytical tool—ex-ante Poverty
Impact Assessment—was developed by
donors in the OECD/DAC Network on
Poverty Reduction  to assess poverty
impacts of projects and programmes.
The subject of the PIA in Senegal was
the Diamniadio Industrial Platform, a
prestigious investment project of the
Government of Senegal, which aimed to
attract funds from i.a. the US Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC). The PIA
process was an insightful experience that
has had a significant impact in Senegal.
PIA proved to be an attractive and very
flexible tool in Senegal—like an
analytical screen that applies to existing
data. The PIA fit into tight planning
schedules with no trouble; results were
easily accessible and presented ready for
deliberation. The tool has the further
advantage of addressing economic and
social issues alike: it demands analytical
reasoning along a large number of
transmission channels, such as ’prices’,
’transfers’ or ’powers’. Every part of the
analysis is logically thought through and
documented, so that ideas get easily
across. Also, it forces you to come up
with numbers and estimates of scale
and to compare various impacts.
The PIA was a perfect basis for discussion
of issues like: What type and size of
impacts is Diamniadio likely to have on
what group of people? What is going
to happen to the workers of businesses
while they are being relocated, which
could take years? What share of new
income will go to poor families, that is
the bottom half of the country’s
households? How many migrants will
come from rural areas to look for work?
Will they be able to participate in the
new economic activity? Will they leave
their families? Will women find work and
what type of work? Will land prices rise in
the longer run? How are neighbouring
communities going to cope?
The availability of the PIA instrument,
which is internationally recognised and
thus not identified with any one donor,
was a major factor in the success of the
entire process in Senegal. The Economy
and Finance Ministry, which leads the
country’s poverty reduction strategy
process, and the state agency in charge
of planning the Diamniadio project
conducted the PIA process fully on
their own terms.
To do this, a key concern was at first
the adaptation of the PIA tool to the
imperatives of the Senegalese context.
They needed to transform the perceptible
donor perspective of the original PIA by
replacing some of the terminology;
French translations of a few key concepts
were changed and the formats of the PIA
matrices were adjusted.
Furthermore, the process was driven
by national expertise only—mostly
economists, sociologists and planning
officials from the two lead institutions,
and some consultants. The institutions
in charge also decided that there should
be significant stakeholder participation.
Thus, local governments and civil
society organisations were kept
informed about the planning process
and invited at strategic moments, even
though this meant more money and
more time—and, of course, more
questions asked.
Diamniadio was to be the star project
under the new ’accelerated growth
strategy’. It was not conceived as a
particularly pro–poor project, but it
was assumed to generate growth and
employment in the agricultural, industrial
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The process proved a perfect
basis for discussing key
issues and assessing poverty
impacts of a planned
industrial estate.
The project agency was
impressed by the results,
above all by the integrated
assessment of the political
and socio-economic
impact chains.
This led to risk mitigating
measures, capacity
development for key
agents in the impact chain,
and amendments to the
governance approach.
The case for planning
by development results
has been strengthened,
and non-state actors have
gained powers.
by Ibrahima Dia,
Economy and Finance Ministry,
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Optimistic estimates reckoned that
within twenty years, 2,000 companies
could be attracted to set up operations
in the project area, which covered more
than 6,000 hectares. Together they
meant to create 75,000 formal jobs in
an economy that only has about three
times as many.
It was planned to mobilise $1.2 billion
overall, which corresponds to about a
tenth of GDP. The public sector was
expected to finance $400 million, which
represents about 15 per cent of the
annual budget. This huge size of the
Diamniadio project meant that the PIA
addressed questions of national
relevance: How can economic growth
impact on poverty in our context? What
are vital infrastructures for economic
growth in Senegal? How realistic is this
project and what can go wrong?
The Senegalese stakeholders had great
expectations about the Diamniadio
project and their hopeful attitude to
the development results of the project
sometimes tended to conflict with a
straightforward analysis of possible
impacts. In the end, however, they did
identify and present a large number
of critical points and risks of the
Diamniadio project in a differentiated
and measured way.
The head of the project executing agency
was impressed by the results, above all
by the integrated assessment of the
political and socio-economic impact
chains, which never before had been
taken into account. Of particular
concern was the predicted risk that
the indigenous population in the project
area would become marginalised, which
could have wider, for instance
ethnic, connotations.
The PIA also discovered that the project
planning had not gone much beyond
the perimeter of the project. The PIA
analysed potential impacts in four
concentric zones, the largest being the
national economy. Thus, civil society
stakeholders in the PIA process were
particularly worried about the prospect
of a massive influx of unskilled migrant
workers into the area adjacent to
Diamniadio that planners had not
provided for. They were concerned that
these districts and villages lacked the
infrastructure to absorb great numbers
of immigrants and were at risk to be
turned into shantytowns. Rising land
prices near the project area were also
a source of apprehension.
The PIA found that Dimniadio might
create up to 23 000 jobs in five years,
but  the overall effects on formal sector
employment would be mixed. In the
short run, initial labour-intensive
construction jobs would be offset by
lay-offs in firms taking time to relocate
to the project area; this would concern
mostly women that made up 70-80
per cent of these employees.
Informal sector employment would
see important growth in the short term,
levelling out in the medium term.
However, the analyst groups expected
unskilled workers to generally remain
poor with their wages under continuous
pressure from an incessant stream
of job-seekers.
Surprisingly, PIA found that the
strongest poverty reducing impacts
of Diamniadio were expected through
remittances from the newly employed to
the poor. It is very common in Senegal
that households with an income
support poorer households, usually
their extended families or villages of
affiliation. The analysts estimated that
on average a third of such income is
transferred to the poor that way.
As a consequence of the PIA report, the
project executing agency conceived
a set of risk mitigating measures, such as
developing the capacities of key agents
in the impact chain, and envisaged
critical changes in the project setup,
such as amendments to the governance
approach of the Diamniadio platform.
Today, the original Diamniadio project
idea is no longer being pursued for
reasons entirely extraneous to the PIA
process.  The project was discarded by the
MCC after the announcement that a new,
private economic free zone would be
created in the vicinity of Diamniadio and
with unusual legal provisions in its favour.
The risk of top level political interference
in the prominent project, which the PIA
had qualified as being high, was thus
confirmed by events faster than the
analysts would have thought.
If the PIA had been done by external
experts, its arguments may by now have
been shelved and forgotten. But the
officials and the stakeholders that
conducted the Diamniadio PIA, and whose
findings are spelled out in the PIA
matrices, are still around. Many of
the results—in particular the analysis of the
transmission channels of growth and the
social risks involved—remain valid and can
be taken up to appeal for improvements
of the new free zone project.
The experience proves the usefulness of
a strong PIA process in a context where
decisions can be unpredictable and project
planning and execution are far apart. In
this case, besides the training on the
tool and the noteworthy results, there
are more systemic impacts: the case for
reasoning by development results has
been considerably strengthened, and
non-state actors have gained powers. In
fact, NGOs began lobbying for changes
in the project when the PIA work alerted
them to the expected social risks; and then
they campaigned openly against the
closure, probably foreseeing that they
would now be altogether excluded from
discussing the economic free zone. 
Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances:
Diamniadio Millennium Platform Project.
Ex Ante Poverty Impact Assessment (PIA).
Dakar, May 2007. <http://www.oecd.org/data
oecd/57/31/39206374.pdf  and  http://www.oecd. org/
dataoecd/57/32/39206523.pdf>.  @
“To start with, we were
mainly curious to see




of the impacts of
Diamniadio on poverty
became more and more
interesting, because
this is a project that
could play an important
role in our country
in the future.”26 International Poverty Centre
PIA was used to study the
impacts of four businesses
operating in ‘base of the
pyramid’ markets that
serve the unmet needs
of poor people.










on impacts should lead to
more investment and
success stories.
Impact assessment is an area
of growing attention among NGOs,
governments, donors, investors, and
companies. The attention given by
such diverse stakeholders has led
to a proliferation in methodologies,
indicators, and frameworks to measure
impacts.  Even the word “impact” means
different things to different stakeholders.
This created a challenge for the World
Resources Institute (WRI), a US-based
environmental NGO, which sought to
measure impacts that would be
recognized by the development
community and private sector alike.
WRI promotes business solutions to
serve the unmet needs of the world’s
four billion low-income people which
constitute the Base of the economic
Pyramid (BOP).  Having helped to shape
the dialogue on BOP business models
through three international conferences—
San Francisco in 2004, Sao Paulo and
Mexico City in 2005—as well as
numerous publications, an online
information portal and the development
of active BOP networks in Mexico and
Brazil, WRI in 2007 undertook an effort
to advance the assessment of broader
impacts of BOP business activities.
After extensive research into the field
of impact assessment, WRI learned that
there was no established methodology
in the private sector or the development
community for measuring BOP business
impact on poverty alleviation. We used
the ex ante Poverty Impact Assessment
(PIA; see page 3 above) to study the
impacts of four businesses operating
in base of the pyramid markets.
WRI applied the impact assessment
methodologies to four BOP business
projects. Each project combined desk
research and data collection in the field
to develop a preliminary report of social
and environmental impacts. The BOP
impact assessment reports completed in
August 2007 are currently under review
by the companies involved.
The PIA process yielded interesting
results for the four projects, which are
summarised below:
Banco Azteca was formed 2002 in
Mexico to target savings, credit, and other
financial services to low-income segments
of the population that traditionally have
not been served by commercial banks.
In 2004, it added the programme
Empresario Azteca (Aztec Businessman)
to support micro-enterprises and
entrepreneurs through credits from Banco
Azteca; it also provides business resources
and consumer credit, and offers council
and support through the Asociación
de Empresario Azteca (ASMAZ), which
integrates a network of medical discounts,
legal council for citizens, protection
against the abuse of authority, and
enterprise qualification.
This study measured the impact of
credit granted to entrepreneurs and
micro-enterprises and how this credit
has affected the health and wellbeing of
these people and their families. Although
the ASMAZ program reports a high
potential to reduce poverty by
strengthening different capabilities—
specifically in terms of health care, legal
empowerment and enhanced human
capital—the study found it necessary
to focus communication and marketing
efforts to inform customers about
these services.
This study finds advantages
of credit for capital goods compared to
common consumer credit.  Customers
receiving training through ASMAZ are
better able to optimally use the credit.
ASMAZ integrates public, private and
by Sheri Willoughby,
World Resources Institute Using PIA for Business
Impact AssessmentPoverty in Focus   April 2008    27
individual services, resulting in a positive
impact in the reduction of poverty.
Masisa is one of the companies
under the Chile-based multinational
corporation GrupoNueva. It operates
under a mandate that 10 per cent of
business will be from BOP consumers.
In Venezuela, carpenters in the renowned
furniture-making town of Magdaleno are
facing economic risk due to a recent ban
on harvesting saman wood, which is
used in traditional artisan carpentry.
In 2006, Masisa developed a programme
to train carpenters to use sustainably-
harvested Caribbean pine fiberboard to
make easily-assembled furniture for the
BOP. In addition, they are working with
women entrepreneurs to bring the
furniture to market. In this study, WRI
examined the initial impacts of Masisa’s
project across their value chain.
The majority of the BOP customers
expressed enhanced living conditions,
such as improved organisation, comfort,
and pride in their home. Although the
financial benefits to the carpenters and
entrepreneurs have been minimal, both
groups have expressed remarkable
increases in knowledge, confidence,
and overall optimism.
All three stakeholder groups have
benefited from the diverse forms of
micro-credit that exist throughout the
supply chain. Masisa has also tapped into
a new market, gained international
recognition, and expanded networking
as a result of this project.
Solar Electric Light Company (SELCO) is
based in Bangalore, India. Since 1995,
SELCO has sold 76,000 solar home
systems to families in rural India.
To reach these customers, SELCO has
established relationships with banks to
provide financing to make the systems
more affordable. Other organisations
provide training to help customers create
better livelihoods with their electricity,
e.g. sewing businesses.
The preliminary results of the study
showed increased ability to save based
on reduced expenditures from kerosene,
direct current, backup batteries, and
candle purchases. BOP customers were
more likely to take up entrepreneurial
activities after gaining access to
solar electricity than middle-income
consumers. For the previously unbanked
customers, establishing a credit history
through taking a loan for the solar
products is expected to have long-term
positive impacts.
West Bengal Renewable Energy
Development Authority (WBREDA) is a
nodal agency of India’s Ministry of New
and Renewable Energy Sources. It has
established several hybrid power plants
under a public-private partnership model
to serve off-grid consumers in the
Sundarban Islands off the coast of
Kolkata (Calcutta). The plants generate
power, which is distributed through a
’mini-grid’ to 250-650 households, shops,
schools, and government buildings.
WBREDA’s intervention has improved
income levels by extending business
hours at night, improving opportunities
for trade and commerce, opening
avenues for self-employment, and
enabling better education and health
facilities in the region. Quantifying the
financial and social cash flows generated
by the Gangasagar wind-diesel hybrid
power plant with 650 customers
gave a net present value of $1.5 million.
The social return on investment (SROI)—
the implied total amount of benefits
for the society generated by every dollar
invested in the plant—was $3.55.
The Kaylapara solar photovoltaic-
biomass gasifier hybrid power plant
with 250 customers generates an overall
financial and social benefit of nearly
$400,000. High investment cost,
low tariff rates, and the limited number
of customers being served contribute to
low SROI results.  However, the average
yearly income benefit for customers of
both plants was $411, nearly double the
$453 annual income of non-electrified
homes. While these results are
preliminary due to the limited scope
of the study, they demonstrate the
usefulness of the methodology and
indicate important development impacts
of the project.
In conclusion, this research will be
valuable for the companies in improving
their impacts, mitigating risks, and
communicating their impacts to
stakeholders. Where projects are making
positive social contributions, greater
awareness and transparency on impacts
should lead to more investment and
success for these businesses.
WRI recently learned that Banco Azteca,
one of the study subjects, launched
additional focus groups with customers
after reading the preliminary results
of the impact assessment to better
understand and mitigate risks that were
identified. Banco Azteca reported that
they found the impact assessment results
and process so useful that they will now
develop a protocol based on the PIA
methodology to continually monitor
their impacts.
WRI has identified useful resources to
answering questions about our
effectiveness in addressing
environmental and social challenges.
Starting from a broad look at indicators
and methodologies, work will continue
with external experts in this field to
ensure that our impact assessment
processes are current and credible.
WRI plans to bring impact assessment
into its work on a consistent basis in
order to identify the most successful
interventions over time as well as the
success factors of partner companies
and investors. These results are being
shared with others in order to encourage
companies to consider their impacts and
attract more capital into sustainable
business models.
T. London: Improving the lives of the poor?
Assessing the impacts of a base-of-the-
pyramid perspective, William Davidson
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